CENSORSHIP

the suppression or prohibition of speech or writing that is condemned as subversive of the common good. It occurs in all manifestations of authority to some degree, but in modern times it has been of special importance in its relation to government and the rule of law. In the ancient world the regulation of the moral, as well as the political, life of a people was considered a proper, if not necessary, role of government. In modern Western society, however, censorship often is considered a relic of an unenlightened and repressive age. A major reason for this difference of opinion is the change in the concept of the individual and his relation to society. Grounded in Christian doctrine and state-of-nature theories about social organization, the modern belief in the dignity of the individual has severely limited the scope of legitimate power to censor. In the ancient Greek communities, as in Rome, it was assumed that the character of a people would and should be shaped by that of the government. Even the quite open society of Athens had limits, as indicated by the trial and conviction of Socrates in 399 BC for his corruption of youth and acknowledgment of unorthodox divinities. In the Republic, Plato outlines a comprehensive system of censorship, particularly of the arts, as part of the development of the best possible regime. Such censorship was an integral part of life in ancient Israel, where opinions and actions were routinely governed by the community. But those in a position to knowthe prophet Nathan, for examplewere expected to speak out against abuses by those in power. This was possible because the community had been trained to share and respect a group of moral principles grounded in thoughtfulness. It led to the encouragement in early Christianity of private, individual testimonies of faith bearing upon the eternal welfare of the soul. Ancient China was perhaps the largest polity to be thoroughly trained on a vast scale. Of great importance were the systems of education and examination that determined one's place in a social structure that made much of the Confucian insistence upon deference to authority and respect for ritual. Under the Chinese system, control of information was retained by the authorities, who also determined the contents of the authoritative texts. In Christendom, perhaps the most dramatic form of censorship was the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, by which the Roman Catholic church for centuries policed the literature available to its followers. Other methods used by authorities (Catholic and non-Catholic alike) to control what people believed or thought were the development of creeds, such as the Nicene Creed, and the conduct of trials, such as those of Joan of Arc (1431) and Thomas More (1535). The struggle against censorship in the Anglo-American world began to take its modern form in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of special importance was John Milton's Areopagitica (1644), in which he argued against a government's right to license (or previously restrain) publication. Milton's definition of freedom of the press, however, did not preclude the condemnation of material after publication, a matter taken up by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (1787) in its guarantee of freedom of speech as well as of the press. Since then, the history of censorship in the United States has been that of the application of those freedoms in a variety of circumstances for the good both of the human being and of the community. Such restrictions upon the scope of censorship as may be seen in the United States and Great Britain have not been instituted throughout the modern world. In totalitarian countries, tight control of the press before publication is maintained, and there are severe sanctions against those who circumvent the system. Such a system of censorship tends to grow out of a polity's principles and experience, including the manner in which it regards considerations of liberty, the common good, and the rights, virtues, and duties of its citizens. the changing or the suppression or prohibition of speech or writing that is condemned as subversive of the common good. It occurs in all manifestations of authority to some degree, but in modern times it has been of special importance in its relation to government and the rule of law. Additional reading In addition to the works of William Blackstone, Confucius, John Stuart Mill, John Milton, Plato, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Thomas Aquinas mentioned in the text, see George Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment (1971), Human Being and Citizen: Essays on Virtue, Freedom and the Common Good (1975), The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (1989), his article on Greece in the 15th ed. of Encyclopdia Britannica, and his article on Confucian thought in Great Ideas Today (1984); Larry Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning (1981); Walter Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment (1957); Redmond A. Burke, What Is the Index? (1952); Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941); Harry M. Clor, Obscenity and Public Morality (1969), and (ed.), The Mass Media and Modern Democracy (1974), including an essay on the Pentagon Papers controversy and on the abolition of television; Joseph Cropsey (ed.), Ancients and Moderns (1964), including essays by Laurence Berns on Aristotle's Poetics and by Hilail Gildin on John Stuart Mill's On Liberty; William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953, reissued 1978); Leo Paul DeAlvarez (ed.), Abraham Lincoln, the Gettysburg Address, and American Constitutionalism (1976); Edward DeGrazia, Censorship Landmarks (1969); Martin Dewhirst and Robert Farrell (eds.), The Soviet Censorship (1973); Norman Dorsen, Paul Bender, andBurt Neuborne (eds.), Political and Civil Rights in the United States, 4th ed., 2 vol. (197679); Gerald Gunther (ed.), Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law, 11th ed. (1985); Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America, ed. by Jamie Kalven (1988); Stanley N. Katz (ed.), A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, 2nd ed. (1972); Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1985); William B. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, and J.H. Choper (eds.), Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments, Questions (1980); Harvey Lomax (ed.), A Contemporary Bibliography in Political Philosophy and in Other Areas (1976); Ralph E. McCoy (ed.), Freedom of the Press: An Annotated Bibliography (1968; suppl., 1979); Robert McDonald, Pillar and Tinderbox: The Greek Press and the Dictatorship (1983); Richard McKeon, Robert K. Merton, and Walter Gellhorn, The Freedom to Read (1957); Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1960, reprinted 1979); Malcolm P. Sharp, Crosskey, Anastaplo and Meiklejohn on the United States Constitution, in University of Chicago Law School Record (Spring 1973); Yves R. Simon, The Philosophy of Democratic Government (1951, reissued 1977); Benedict De Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise (1670); and Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952, reprinted 1973), Natural Right and History (1953), and, with Joseph Cropsey (eds.), History of Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. (1972, reprinted 1981). George Anastaplo History of censorship It should be instructive to consider how the problem of censorship has been dealt with in the ancient world, in premodern times, and in the modern world. Care must be taken here not to assume that the modern democratic regime, of a self-governing people, is the only legitimate regime. Rather, it is prudent to assume that most of those who have, in other times and places, thought about and acted upon such matters have been at least as humane and as sensible in their circumstances as modern democrats are apt to be in theirs. Ancient Greece and Rome It was taken for granted in the Greek communities of antiquity, as well as in Rome, that citizens would be formed in accordance with the character and needs of the regime. This did not preclude the emergence of strong-minded men and women, as may be seen in the stories of Homer, of Plutarch, of Tacitus, and of the Greek playwrights. But it was evident, for example, that a citizen of Sparta was much more apt to be tough and unreflective (and certainly uncommunicative) than a citizen of Corinth (with its notorious openness to pleasure and luxury). The scope of a city's concern was exhibited in the provisions it made for the establishment and promotion of religious worship. That the gods of the city were to be respected by every citizen was usually taken for granted. Presiding over religious observances was generally regarded as a privilege of citizenship: thus, in some cities it was an office in which the elderly in good standing could be expected to serve. A refusal to conform, at least outwardly, to the recognized worship of the community subjected one to hardships. And there could be difficulties, backed up by legal sanctions, for those who spoke improperly about such matters. The force of religious opinions could be seen not only in prosecutions for refusals to acknowledge the gods of the city but perhaps even more in the frequent unwillingness of a city (no matter what its obvious political or military interests) to conduct public business at a time when the religious calendar, auspices, or other such signs forbade civic activities. Indicative of respect for the proprieties was the secrecy with which the religious mysteries, such as those into which many Greek and Roman men were initiated, were evidently practicedso much so that there does not seem to be any record from antiquity of precisely what constituted the various mysteries. Respect for the proprieties may be seen as well in the outrage provoked in Sparta by a poem by Archilochus (7th century BC) in which he celebrated his lifesaving cowardice. Athens, it can be said, was much more liberal than the typical Greek city. This is not to suggest that the rulers of the other cities did not, among themselves, freely discuss the public business. But in Athens the rulers included much more of the population than in most cities of antiquityand freedom of speech (for political purposes) spilled over there into the private lives of citizens. This may be seen, perhaps best of all, in the famous funeral address given by Pericles in 431 BC. Athenians, he pointed out, did not consider public discussion merely something to be put up with; rather, they believed that the best interests of the city could not be served without a full discussion of the issues before the assembly. There may be seen in the plays of an Aristophanes the kind of uninhibited discussions of politics that the Athenians were evidently accustomed to, discussions that could (in the license accorded to comedy) be couched in licentious terms not permitted in everyday discourse. The limits of Athenian openness may be seen, of course, in the trial, conviction, and execution of Socrates in 399 BC on charges that he corrupted the youth and that he did not acknowledge the gods that the city did but other new divinities of his own. One may see, as well, in the Republic of Plato an account of a system of censorship, particularly of the arts, that is comprehensive. Not only are various opinions (particularly misconceptions about the gods and about the supposed terrors of death) to be discouraged, but various salutary opinions are to be encouraged and protected without having to be demonstrated to be true. Much of what is said in the Republic and elsewhere reflects the belief that the vital opinions of the community could be shaped by law and that men could be penalized for saying things that offended public sensibilities, undermined common morality, or subverted the institutions of the community. The circumstances justifying the system of comprehensive thought control described in Plato's Republic are obviously rarely to be found. Thus, Socrates himself is recorded in the same dialogue (and in Plato's Apology) as recognizing that cities with bad regimes do not permit their misconduct to be questioned and corrected. Such regimes should be compared with those in the age of the good Roman emperors, the period from Nerva (c. AD 3098) to Marcus Aurelius (121180), the golden times, said Tacitus, when everyone could hold and defend whatever opinions he wished.