CLAUSEWITZ, CARL (PHILIPP GOTTLIEB) VON

born June 1, 1780, Burg, near Magdeburg, Prussia died Nov. 16, 1831, Breslau, Silesia Prussian general whose writings, especially On War, advocated the concept of total war, in which all the enemy's territory, property, and citizens are attacked. Born to a poor but middle-class family of professional background, Clausewitz entered the Prussian Army in 1792. He was commissioned during the Rhine campaign of 179394 against the French Revolutionary army and spent the next several years on garrison duty, a circumstance that enabled him to devote a large amount of time to educating himself. His efforts eventually enabled him to gain admission to the War College in Berlin in 1801. During his formative years in Berlin, Clausewitz learned military science under the guidance of his mentor, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, studied philosophy and literature, and developed his basic strategic concepts. Scharnhorst introduced him at courtwhere he met his future wife, the countess Marie von Brhland obtained for him an appointment as aide to Prince August. He served in this capacity in the campaign of Jena (1806), was captured by the French at Prenzlau, and returned to Prussia in 1808. Clausewitz became one of the leaders of Prussian Army reform under Scharnhorst but resigned his commission on the eve of Napoleon's invasion of Russia (1812) and, like other German patriots, entered Russian service. In the campaign of 1812, Clausewitz distinguished himself as a Russian staff officer. He was partially responsible for the Russians' successful strategic retreat and for negotiating the Convention of Tauroggen, which marked the beginning of Prussia's abandonment of the French cause. After having served in various capacities during the campaigns of 181314, he returned to Prussian service and served as chief of staff of an army corps during the Waterloo campaign. In 1818 he became a general and was appointed administrative head of the War College. During the next 12 years, Clausewitz used much of the leisure that this position provided in writing his historical studies and his major work on strategy, On War (Vom Kriege). It is on these that his fame rests. Drawing on the experiences of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, Clausewitz tried to analyze the workings of military genius by isolating the factors that decide success in war. His conclusions have remained generally applicable, and since his work contains a minimum of technical discussion, it has retained a wide appeal. Clausewitz produced no system of strategy, thus breaking with the more rigid and mechanistic concepts of his predecessors. Instead, he emphasized the importance of psychological and accidental factors that elude exact calculation and the necessity of a critical approach to strategic problems. By means of a lengthy discussion of a variety of situations likely to confront the military leader, Clausewitz tried to develop in his reader a theoretically founded military judgment, capable of weighing all pertinent factors in a given situation. He stated that strategy should aim at three main targets: the enemy's forces, his resources, and his will to fight. Defensive warfare, he argued, is both militarily and politically the stronger position. Before he completed On War, Clausewitz was transferred to Breslau and then assigned to Prussian forces deployed to observe the Polish revolution of 1830. He contracted cholera and died on Nov. 16, 1831, shortly after his return to Breslau. His papers were edited and published by his devoted widow. Clausewitz' personality reflected not only his relatively humble origins but also the strong influence of contemporary German literature and philosophy. Shy and sensitive by nature, he often kept his ideas to himself. He never had a command of his own but served mostly in a staff capacity, distinguishing himself through his sound advice and bravery in combat. His background and career identified him more closely with the broader movements for national German revival than with the aristocratic Prussian military tradition. While Clausewitz' extensive histories of the various Napoleonic campaigns are only of technical interest, On War has had a profound influence on modern strategic concepts. Its most significant single contribution is the doctrine of political direction in military matters. In maintaining that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with the admixture of different means, he denied that war is an end in itself. Clausewitz was studied closely by his countrymen and left his imprint on German military thought, but his influence on actual German strategy has been overrated. Beginning with the 1853 edition of On War, a crucial passage calling for Cabinet control of strategy was altered to prescribe the reverse, and German military planning became increasingly devoid of political purpose. There was, however, a considerable revival of interest in Clausewitz during the interwar period. Clausewitz was read extensively outside of Germany. Swedish, Dutch, Swiss, and Austrian officers took an early interest in his doctrines, and most of his works were translated into French. An English translation of On War appeared in 1873, and other editions exist in Russian, Italian, Hebrew, Hungarian, Serbian, and Spanish. By 1900 his doctrines were known in the United States and Japan. The first American translations appeared during World War II. Marx and Engels discussed Clausewitz' work, and Lenin studied his political doctrines during his exile in Switzerland. Communist theory on the nature of war, including such concepts as that of imperialistic war, was largely derived from Clausewitz. By the middle of the 20th century, when new long-range weapons systems had appeared, the significance of Clausewitz' strategic concepts relating exclusively to land warfare declined, although many of his basic ideas remained as valid as ever. Arnold H. Price