THEISM

the view that all limited, or finite, things, though fully real in their own right, are dependent in some way upon, yet distinct from, one supreme or ultimate being, of which one may also speak in personal terms. In religions, one speaks of this being as God, who is regarded as beyond human comprehension, perfect, and self-sustained but also peculiarly involved in the world and its events. Theists characteristically seek support for their contentions in rational argument and appeals to experience. In the history of Western thought, this has given rise to several types of arguments for the existence of God. The four primary types are the cosmological, teleological, ontological, and moral arguments. Frequently these arguments are propounded in combination. Cosmological arguments begin with a recognition of particular features of the world, or of the fact of its existence, and then infer God as the ultimate cause. The world is seen as dependent upon some being beyond it for its intelligibility and existence. The classic statement of the cosmological argument was given by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica (Part I, Question ii, art. 3). The teleological argument proceeds from an observation of the functional order of the universe whereby things in the world function toward ends or goals. One version of this argument is, strictly speaking, a form of cosmological argument since it depends upon a notion of final causality, holding that purposeful actions must be ultimately designed or directed by an intelligent purposive being. This argument received its clearest expression in David Hume's critical analysis of the argument from design, in which the universe is seen as an orderly machine. The ontological argument attempts to show that the concept of God implies the necessity of God's existence. The classic statement of this argument is found in Anselm's Proslogion, which defines God as that than which nothing greater can be conceived. One form of this argument is based on the claim that existence is a perfection among others and that, since God embraces all perfections, God must exist. This argument commonly falls under the criticism that existence is not a predicate that can be attributed or denied. Another form of ontological argument asserts that God can only be conceived as a necessary being and therefore cannot be conceived as nonexistent or merely possible. The moral argument was developed by Immanuel Kant. This argument rests upon the experience of obligation or moral duty. Kant argued that for morality to be rationally justified and hold an influence over human actions, it must be assumed that obedience to obligation will coincide with happiness. Thus, a God must be postulated as the being who rewards worthiness and enables moral life to be rationally understood. It is generally agreed that none of these arguments prove the existence of God in any strict sense. All depend upon certain disputable presuppositions. Such proofs are generally seen as means of examining the logical correlates of belief or disbelief. Although conceptions of God vary greatly with cultural, religious, and historical circumstances, there are some features common to theistic claims. Theism commonly views God as somehow caringly related to the world. This has generally been expressed in some analogy of God to a personal being. Theism has also tended to affirm both the immanence and the transcendence of this ultimate being. Other attributes of God, such as infinity, eternity, omniscience, and omnipotence, are treated by theists in accordance with analogies drawn from human experience. A major problem is to understand how finite and imperfect characteristics can be understood as existing perfectly in God. Another central issue is that of reconciling the claims that God is both omnipotent and perfect with the existence of evil in the world. The problem of evil exists as such only upon the assumption that the universe is the expression of a divine ground and thus primarily concerns the divine nature and not God's existence. While no doctrine of God is independent of the ideas and beliefs found in the historical religious traditions, theism represents a constructive philosophical position not to be identified with any particular religion. Frequently, a theistic line of thought has developed within a particular religion. Thus, for example, one can speak of Christian theism or of theistic interpretations of Hinduism. Theism thus appears both as a philosophico-theological position in its own right and as an identifiable strain of thought within institutional theologies. Theists have responded quite variously to the questions regarding the nature and attributes of God. They have encountered criticism from those who deny the ability of reason beyond ordinary experience, those who reject the role of reason in favour of revelation alone, and those who accept the rational method but reject the theistic conclusions. Nevertheless, theists continue to use rational argument to support their contentions that a God exists who is creative and sustaining of the world and toward whom the world is directed in a purposeful manner. the view that all limited or finite things are dependent in some way on one supreme or ultimate reality of which one may also speak in personal terms. Theism's view of God can be clarified by contrasting it with that of deism, of pantheism, and of mysticism. Deism closely resembles theism; but for the deist, God is not involved in the world in the same personal way. He has made it, so to speak, or set the laws of itand to that extent he sustains it in being. But subject to this final and somewhat remote control, God, as the deist sees him, allows the world to continue in its own way. This view simplifies some problems, especially those that arise from the scientific account of the world: one does not have to allow for any factor that cannot be handled and understood in the ordinary way. God is in the shadows or beyond; and, though men may still in some way centre their lives upon him, this calls for no radical adjustment at the human or finite level. The deist proceeds, for most purposes at least, as if there were no Godor only an absent one; and this approach is especially true of man's understanding of the world. This is why deism appealed so much to thinkers in the time of the first triumphs of modern science. They could indeed allow for God, but they had no need of that hypothesis in science or in their normal account of things. Religion, being wholly superadded, was significant only in a manner that involved little else in the world or in the way man lives. The theist, on the other hand, questions this view and seeks in various ways (as noted below) to bring man's relation to God into closer involvement with the way he understands himself and the world around him. Theism also sharply contrasts with pantheism, which identifies God with all that there is; and with various forms of monism, which regards all finite things as parts, modes, limitations, or appearances of some one ultimate Being, which is all that there is. Some types of absolute Idealism, a philosophy of all-pervading Mind, while regarding every finite thing as comprising some limitation of the one whole of Being, seek also to retain the theistic element in their view of the world; and they do this normallyas in the works of A.E. Taylor, Andrew Pringle-Pattison, or G.F. Stoutby stressing the role of unifying finite centres, such as self-conscious human beings, in the way the universe as a whole functions. But there is no recognition here of the finality of what is technically known as the distinctness of persons. The theist, by contrast, considers the world to be quite distinct from its Author or Creator, human life being thus in no sense strictly the life of God, while also making room for a peculiarly intimate involvement of God in the world and in human life. Mysticism in practice comes close to theism; but mystical thought, and much of its practice, has often involved a repudiation of the proper reality of finite things and sometimes (as in a work by W.T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy) tends to dismiss all of the finite manifold or multiplicity of things as some wholly unreal phantasm that has no place in the one undiversified Being, which alone is real. Theism is very far removed from ideas of this kind. Additional reading A classic statement of God's transcendence is A.M. Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 2nd ed. (1959), a difficult but essential book on theism; C.A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood (1957), is an exceptionally lucid presentation that allows for the distinctness of finite beings; see also further statements in William Temple, Nature, Man and God (1934); H.H. Farmer, God and Men (1947); and H.D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion (1965). A. Seth Pringle-Pattison presents the more traditional Idealist view in The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy (1920). An Idealism stressing the immediate awareness of other minds and of God is found in W.E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (1912); a presentation similarly starting from Empiricism and science that culminates in a Cosmic Teleology is that of F.R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2 vol. (192830). E.S. Brightman, The Problem of God (1930), treats God as a limited being (finitism).