FEDERALIST, THE

series of 85 essays on the proposed new U.S. Constitution and on the nature of republican government, published in 178788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in an effort to persuade New York state voters to support ratification. Seventy-seven of the essays first appeared serially in New York newspapers, were reprinted in most other states, and were published in book form on May 28, 1788; the remaining eight papers appeared in New York newspapers between June 14 and August 16. All the papers appeared over the signature Publius, and the authorship of some of the papers was once a matter of scholarly dispute. However, modern computer analysis, added to existing historical evidence, has caused almost all historians to agree that the authorship is the following: Hamilton wrote numbers 1, 69, 1113, 1517, 2136, 5961, and 6585; Madison numbers 10, 14, 1820, 3758, and 6263; and Jay numbers 25 and 64. Taken together, The Federalist papers presented a masterly exposition of the new federal system and of the major departments in the proposed central government. They also argued that the existing government under the Articles of Confederation was defective and that the proposed Constitution would remedy its weaknesses without endangering the liberties of the people. As a general treatise on republican government, The Federalist is distinguished for its comprehensive analysis of the means by which the ideals of justice, the general welfare, and the rights of individuals could be realized. The authors assumed that the primary political motive of man was self-interest and that men, whether acting individually or collectively, were selfish and only imperfectly rational. The establishment of republican government would not of itself provide protection against such characteristics. The representatives of the people might betray their trust; one part of the people might oppress another; both the representatives and the people themselves might give way to passion or caprice. The possibility of good government lay in man's capacity to devise political institutions that would compensate for deficiencies in both reason and virtue in the ordinary conduct of politics. This was the predominant theme in late 18th-century political thought in America and accounts in part for the elaborate system of checks and balances written into the U.S. Constitution. Of particular note is the 10th essay. In it Madison rejected the then common belief that republican government was possible only for small states. He argued that stability, liberty, and justice were more likely to be achieved in a large area with a numerous and heterogeneous population. Though frequently interpreted as an attack on majority rule, the essay is in reality a defense of social, economic, and cultural pluralism and a defense of a composite majority formed by compromise and conciliation. Decision by such a majority, rather than by a monistic one, would be more likely to accord with the proper ends of government. This distinction between a proper and an improper majority typifies the fundamental philosophy of The Federalist: republican institutions, including the principle of majority rule, were not good in themselves but were good because they constituted the best means for the pursuit of justice and the preservation of liberty.