ISLAMIC THOUGHT

Islamic thought Social and ethical principles Family life A basic social teaching of Islam is the encouragement of marriage, and the Qur'an regards celibacy definitely as something exceptionalto be resorted to only under economic stringency. Thus, monasticism as a way of life was severely criticized by the Qur'an. With the appearance of Sufism, however, many Sufis preferred celibacy, and some even regarded women as an evil distraction from piety, although marriage remained the normal practice also with Sufis. Polygamy, which was practiced in pre-Islamic Arabia, was permitted by the Qur'an, which, however, limited the number of simultaneous wives to four, and this permission was made dependent upon the condition that justice be done among co-wives. The Qur'an even suggests that You shall never be able to do justice among women, no matter how much you desire. Medieval law and society, however, regarded this justice to be primarily a private matter between a husband and his wives, although the law did provide redress in cases of gross neglect of a wife. Right of divorce was also vested basically in the husband, who could unilaterally repudiate his wife, although the woman could also sue her husband for divorce before a court on certain grounds. The virtue of chastity is regarded as of prime importance by Islam. The Qur'an advanced its universal recommendation of marriage as a means to ensure a state of chastity (ihsan), which is held to be induced by a single free wife. The Qur'an states that those guilty of adultery are to be severely punished with 100 lashes. Tradition has intensified this injunction and has prescribed this punishment for unmarried persons, but married adulterers are to be stoned to death. A false accusation of adultery is punishable by 80 lashes. The general ethic of the Qur'an considers the marital bond to rest on mutual love and mercy, and the spouses are said to be each other's garments. The detailed laws of inheritance prescribed by the Qur'an also tend to confirm the idea of a central familyhusband, wife, and children, along with the husband's parents. Easy access to polygamy (although the normal practice in Islamic society has always been that of monogamy) and easy divorce on the part of the husband led, however, to frequent abuses in the family. In recent times, most Muslim countries have enacted legislation to tighten up marital relationships. Rights of parents in terms of good treatment are stressed in Islam, and the Qur'an extols filial piety, particularly tenderness to the mother, as an important virtue. A murderer of his father is automatically disinherited. The tendency of the Islamic ethic to strengthen the immediate family on the one hand and the community on the other at the expense of the extended family or tribe did not succeed, however. Muslim society, until the encroachments upon it of modernizing influences, has remained basically one composed of tribes or quasi-tribes. Despite urbanization, tribal affiliations offer the greatest resistance to change and development of a modern polity. So strong, indeed, has been the tribal ethos that, in most Muslim societies, daughters are not given their inheritance share prescribed by the sacred law in order to prevent disintegration of the joint family's patrimony. The state Because Islam draws no distinction between the religious and the temporal spheres of life, the Muslim state is by definition religious. The main differences between the Sunni, Khawarij, and Shi'i concepts of rulership have already been pointed out above. It should be noted that, although the office of the Sunni caliph (khalifah, one who is successor to the Prophet in rulership) is religious, this does not imply any functions comparable to those of the pope. The caliph has no authority either to define dogma or, indeed, even to legislate. He is the chief executive of a religious community, and his primary function is to implement the sacred law and work in the general interests of the community. He himself is not above the law and if necessary can even be deposed, at least in theory. Sunni political theory is essentially a product of circumstancean after-the-fact rationalization of historical developments. Thus, between the Shi'ah legitimism that restricts rule to 'Ali's family and the Khawarij democratism that allowed rulership to anyone, even to an Ethiopian slave, Sunnism held the position that rule belonged to the Quraysh (the Prophet's tribe)the condition that actually existed. Again, in view of the extremes represented by the Khawarij, who demanded rebellion against what they considered to be unjust or impious rule, and Shi'ites, who raised the imam to a metaphysical plane of infallibility, Sunnites took the position that a ruler has to satisfy certain qualifications but that rule cannot be upset on small issues. Indeed, under the impact of civil wars started by the Khawarij, Sunnism drifted to more and more conformism and actual toleration of injustice. The first step taken in this direction by the Sunnites was the enunciation that one day of lawlessness is worse than 30 years of tyranny. This was followed by the principle that Muslims must obey even a tyrannical ruler. Soon, however, the sultan (ruler) was declared to be shadow of God on earth. No doubt, the principle was also adoptedand insisted uponthat there can be no obedience to the ruler in disobedience of God; but there is no denying the fact that the Sunni doctrine came more and more to be heavily weighted on the side of political conformism. This change is also reflected in the principles of legitimacy. Whereas early Islam had confirmed the pre-Islamic democratic Arab principle of rule by consultation (shura) and some form of democratic election of the leader, those practices soon gave way to dynastic rule with the advent of the Umayyads. The shura was not developed into any institutionalized form and was, indeed, soon discarded. Soon the principle of might is right came into being, and later theorists frankly acknowledged that actual possession of effective power is one method of the legitimization of power. In spite of this development, the ruler could not become absolute because a basic restraint was placed upon him by the Shari'ah law under which he held his authority and which he dutifully was bound to execute and defend. When, in the latter half of the 16th century, the Mughal emperor Akbar in India wanted to arrogate to himself the right of administrativelegal absolutism, the strong reaction of the orthodox thwarted his attempt. In general, the 'ulama' (religious scholars) jealously upheld the sovereign position of the Shari'ah against the political authority. The effective shift of power from the caliph to the sultan was, again, reflected in the redefinition of the functions of the caliph. It was conceded that, if the caliph administered through wazirs (viziers or ministers) or subordinate rulers (amirs), it was not necessary for him to embody all the physical, moral, and intellectual virtues theoretically insisted upon earlier. In practice, however, the caliph was no more than a titular head from the middle of the 10th century onward, when real power passed to self-made and adventurous amirs and sultans, who merely used the caliph's name for legitimacy.