JURY

historic legal institution in which a group of laymen participate in a major way in deciding cases brought to trial. Its exact characteristics and powers depend on the laws and practices of the countries, provinces, or states in which it is found, and there is considerable variation. Basically, however, it recruits laymen at random from the widest population for the trial of a particular case and allows them to deliberate in secrecy, to reach a decision by other than majority vote, and to make it public without giving reasons. Throughout its history, it has been both overpraised as a charter of liberty and overcriticized as a reliance on incompetent amateurs in the administration of justice. a group of laymen that decides factual issues in criminal and civil trials. It is predominantly an Anglo-American institution, and its particular characteristics vary among countries, provinces, and states. In general, jury members are randomly selected from the greatest population to which the outcome of a case might apply. The jury can usually consider a case in secrecy and announce its verdict without providing a public explanation. Historical details of the jury's inception are unknown, but it may have originated in England or have been introduced there by the Normans after 1066. The development of jury trials is believed to have been an important factor in centralizing English courts and establishing common law. At the beginning of the 15th century, jury trials had replaced such unreasonable methods of deciding cases as ordeal, through which innocence or guilt was determined by the defendant's ability or inability to endure torture. The jury system expanded with the British Empire to regions of Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. The French Revolution precipitated its use for major and political cases in France, the Rhineland, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, Switzerland, a few German states, Holland, and Luxembourg. The latter two countries, however, discontinued its use after Napoleon's fall in 181415. The jury in non-Anglo-American countries lost power and became far less common in the 19th and early 20th centuries. For example, its use for treason was discontinued in 1850 in Prussia; and it was abandoned completely in Hungary in 1919 and Germany in 1924. Also, the jury was abolished in France during the German occupation of the 1940s. Although it is used in England for certain kinds of cases, jury trials occur most frequently in the United States. Approximately 120,000 are held there annually; these represent 90 percent of all those in the world. Use of the jury in criminal and civil cases in the United States is contingent upon whether it is available and whether or not the defendant or plaintiff wishes to use it. In the case of Duncan v. Louisiana in 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that for criminal cases involving a sentence of more than six months, a jury trial is a constitutional right. For the most part, it is also readily available for civil cases. In the past, there were certain property and competence requirements for jury service; but true random selection became the policy of the U.S. federal courts in 1969 and is presently common in most states. Such professionals as policemen, lawyers, and doctors are exempt from jury service in many areas, and potential jurors are often excused if service will create an undue imposition. Voir dire, the process of juror selection by trial counsel, involves elimination of candidates either for alleged partiality or by peremption (without supplied reasons). Historically, the jury has been composed of 12 members, and unanimity was required in deciding cases. These characteristics have been altered in various capacities over time. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the use of six-member juries in cases of lesser importance, and the unanimity requirements have been relaxed for several types of cases. Majority verdicts are frequently acceptable in misdemeanor or civil trials. When the jury cannot reach a verdict (called a hung jury in the United States), a mistrial is declared, and the case in question must be retried. In Europe and in U.S. Army court-martial juries, a two-thirds majority must agree that a defendant is guilty, or else he must be acquitted. The jury's duty is to decide issues of fact in the trial. In civil cases, the jury decides on matters of liability and amount of damages, while in criminal cases, its role is limited to the determination of innocence or guilt, and the judge decides the issue of punishment. In some courts the jury is allowed to declare a sentence within legally specified limits. Also, in jurisdictions in which the death penalty is legal, the jury sometimes decides whether or not it should be imposed. Guilty verdicts and sentencing decisions are usually given simultaneously, but several courts have second trials specifically to determine what punishment a guilty defendant should receive. The jury trial is always overseen by a judge, who decides (to a certain extent) what evidence is appropriate for the jury to hear. Also, if the evidence does not leave a question of fact to be answered, the judge may take the case from the jury. The judge instructs the jury in laws that are applicable to the case at hand. Finally, if the judge finds that a verdict is clearly discordant with the implications of the evidence, he may order a retrial of the case. A notable exception to this last rule under Anglo-American law is that criminal acquittal by jury is absolute. The jury is usually not required to supply reasons for its verdict, but in some cases the judge directs it to determine certain specific facts. Additional reading Overviews of legal institutions within specific countries include R.M. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England , 7th ed. (1977); Lewis Mayers, The American Legal System, rev. ed. (1964, reprinted 1981); Robert A. Carp and Ronald Stidham, Judicial Process in America, 2nd ed. (1993), from a political perspective; G. Leroy Certoma, The Italian Legal System (1985); and Harihar Prasad Dubey, A Short History of the Judicial Systems of India and Some Foreign Countries (1968). Works with a broader scope are Ren David and John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 3rd ed. (1985; originally published in French, 8th ed., 1982); Sybille Bedford, The Faces of Justice (1961), discussing how cases are handled in England, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and France; John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America, 2nd ed. (1985), summarizing the principles and institutions in civil-law countries; and C.G. Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence (1988), concentrating on Islamic issues. Karl Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America (1989; originally published in German, 1933), is a pre-World War II classic on the American legal system from a foreign perspective.Both James E. Bond, The Art of Judging (1987); and Steven J. Burton, Judging in Good Faith (1992), provide a philosophical approach to law judging. Joel Levin, How Judges Reason: The Logic of Adjudication (1992), explains the author's theory of judicial pluralism and criticizes other theories. Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges (1993), offers a linguistic analysis of judicial language. Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France, 6th ed. (1993), is a classic text. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921, reissued 1991), is an explanation by a distinguished judge of how an appellate court reaches its decisions. Roscoe Pound, Organization of Courts (1940, reprinted 1979), gives a detailed treatment of U.S. court structure. W.R. Cornish, The Jury, rev. ed. (1971), is a comprehensive British essay on the jury, combining traditional learning with new empirical material. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881, reprinted 1991), is a classic treatment of the growth of law through judicial decisions.Discussions of politics and law include Jerome R. Corsi, Judicial Politics (1984), an introductory text; David Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, rev. ed. (1990), a compilation of essays; and Jerold L. Waltman and Kenneth M. Holland (eds.), The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies (1988), examining the United States, Australia, Canada, the former West Germany, England, France, Italy, Sweden, and Japan. Patricia Smith (ed.), Feminist Jurisprudence (1993), is a compilation of essays by leading scholars. Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication (1990), is a liberal review of the Supreme Court that rejects original meaning by presenting the Constitution as a living document.