(1900-1976) Wrote The Concept of Mind and Dilemmas . Oxford School of analysis, ordinary language philosophy, behaviorism . "Philosophical
arguments are intended not to increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess." The "logical geography" of one concept needing rectification is the "official doctrine" of the
"dogma of the Ghost in the Machine," i.e., historically, Descartes 's beliefs concerning mind and body. This "dogma" arises from a mistaken analysis of
ordinary expression about, e.g., what the "mind" or "body" does, etc. The specific error is the category mistake, which consists in "the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another" or in the allocation of "concepts to logical types to which they do not belong." Concerning the mind-body problem, Ryle holds that all statements that refer to minds are really statements about current bodily behavior or hypothetical statements about predicted bodily behavior.