INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

history of world diplomacy and events from the period of World War I to the last decade of the 20th century. The purpose of diplomatic history is to explain the origins and the effects of foreign policies, and its focus is each country's policy-making elite. This involves the historian at once in a complication, however. The statesman exists simultaneously in two realms: the domestic political system whence his authority derives, and the international system in which he represents his state to the world. Pressures and problems, temptations and opportunities arise constantly from both realms. Which one ought to command the historian's attention? The founders of modern diplomatic history, beginning with Leopold von Ranke, propounded a view known as the primacy of foreign policy. Founded on German Idealist philosophy, Rankeanism asserted the primary influence of a state's geography and external threats in the shaping not only of its foreign policy but of its internal military, political, and cultural institutions as well. An island kingdom like Britain, for instance, free of the constant threat of invasion, could militarily afford and commercially benefit from liberal institutions. Prussia, by contrast, relatively poor and surrounded by potential enemies, required for its survival as a state rigorous centralization and militarization. The primacy of foreign policy was especially plausible to historians immersed in the diplomacy of medieval and early modern Europe, when foreign policy was a virtual monopoly of the prince and his advisers. The rationalist bias of the Enlightenment reinforced the notion of the international state-system as a kind of self-regulating Newtonian universe in which states revolved about each other in alliance or war according to natural laws of self-interest and balance of power. A wise ruler like Frederick II the Great of Prussia saw himself as the first servant of the state and made policy according to raison d'tat, the prudent and rational dictate of dynastic interest. This model of the international system, while reductionist, was not determinist, since it made room for the wisdom and folly, courage and cowardice of individual rulers. The debate over the origins of World War I, and the failure of documentary reconstruction of the diplomatic narrative to resolve the question of responsibility for 1914, threw diplomatic history into a crisis. By the late 1920s historians like Sidney Fay and Pierre Renouvin were looking beyond the documents for the deeper causes of the war, such as militarism or imperialism. Historians influenced by sociology and economics, in turn, located the seeds of the fateful foreign policies preceding the war in the economic and social conflicts of prewar Europe. A young German, Eckhart Kehr, turned Ranke on his head by postulating a primacy of domestic policy and argued that a state's foreign policy derives from domestic social and political forces, not vice versa. In particular, imperialism and militarism were seen to be defensive strategies by which threatened elites attempted to rally their people against a foreign threat as distraction from social tensions at home. If the old history was simplistic and dangerous in its glamorization of the exercise of power, the theory of primacy of domestic policy tended to ignore the fact that governments are obliged to respond to real pressures from abroad regardless of their domestic situation. An empirical approach, therefore, is to examine the internal sources of foreign policy in all states and also the effects of those policies on all other states as they are transmitted through the international system. The conduct and analysis of diplomacy and war ultimately rest on a calculus of the power of each state in the system and of its perception by others. National power is the product of all those assets, human and material, that contribute to a state's ability to influence the behaviour of other states by force, threat, or inducement. Human sources of power include population, educational level and work discipline, morale, motivation (through ideology, patriotism, or charismatic leadership), and skill in military and civil administration. Material resources include land area and climate, geographic location, raw materials, and agricultural resources. Last but not least is technology, which is a function of both human and material resources and which can alter the importance of population and geography and render once-effective administrative systems obsolete. Despite the best efforts of political scientists and military planners, these elements of national power are difficult to quantify and compare. Hence misperception by one state of another's capabilities and intentions is almost the rule rather than the exception. This is why those elusive assets prestige and intelligence are sometimes decisive in diplomacy and war. International relations are shaped primarily by those states perceived to be Great Powers, countries whose interests and capabilities transcend their own self-defense or region. For some 200 years after the treaties of Utrecht and Nystad (171314, 1721), the roster of the Great Powers included the same five states: Great Britain, France, Prussia (and, later, Germany), the Habsburg monarchy (Austria), and Russia. A mere three decades after World War I, however, only one of these venerable powers, Britain, had not undergone two or more radical changes of government, and only one, Russia, was still a Great Power. Between 1914 and 1945 the European system committed suicide, and two global superpowers rose to replace it. Five decades after 1945, the Soviet Union was no more, while the ability of the United States to control events was in turn challenged from many sources, giving rise to speculation that the world might be shifting back into a multipolar balance-of-power system. This article provides a single integrated narrative of world diplomacy and politics from the outbreak of World War I to the 1990s. Its twin themes are the rivalries of the Great Powers during the age of the world wars and the Cold War and the replacement, largely through the agency of those wars, of the European state system by a world system with many centres of both power and discord. Because domestic affairs figure heavily in the analysis of each state's foreign policies, the reader should consult the histories of the individual countries for more detail. For discussion of the military strategy, tactics, and conduct of World War I and World War II, see World Wars, The. A fragile stability, 192229 The 1920s are usually depicted as a bridge between the turmoil of the war and the turmoil of the 1930s, a brief truce in the Thirty Years' War of the 20th century. The disputes over execution of the Treaty of Versailles suggest a continuation of the Great War by other means, while the economic and security arrangements of mid-decade, and the era of good feeling they engendered, were flawed from their inception and collapsed with the onset of the Great Depression. Still, the postwar decade was Shakespeare's time for frighted peace to pant. The conflicts of the early 1920s notwithstanding, weary populations had no stomach for war and demanded, in President Harding's words, a return to normalcy, however fragile it might prove. A broken world The failure of democratic consensus But what was normal in a world broken by total war? The pillars of the antebellum systemthe balance of power, the non-interventionist state, the gold standard, and the free-market economylay in ruins and in any case reflected a faith in the natural play of political and economic forces that many Europeans had ceased to share. Wilsonians and Leninists blamed balance-of-power diplomacy for the war and fled from such normalcy. Technocrats, impressed by the productivity of regulated war economies, hoped to extend them into peacetime to promote recovery and dampen competition. Some economists and politicians even applauded the demise of the gold standard (a barbarous relic, said Keynes) since inflation seemed the only means of financing jobs and veterans' pensions, thus stabilizing domestic societies. Finally, the free-market economy that had made high growth rates and technological dynamism seem normal from 1896 to 1914 was itself challenged by Socialists on the left and corporate interest groups on the right. In every case governments found it easier to try to shift the burden of reconstruction on to foreign powers, through reparations, loans, or inflation, than to impose taxes and austerity on quarreling social groups at home. It soon became clear that the effects of the war would continue to politicize economic relations within and between countries; that the needs of internal stability conflicted with the needs of international stability; that old dreams clashed with new realities, and new dreams with old realities. Additional reading General works Important international histories of the 20th century are William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History (1984); and Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present, 3rd ed. (1984). Also of interest are Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties (1983), episodic but insightful; and Ren Albrecht-Carri, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (1973), a standard survey. The interpretive essays by Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle (1962; originally published in German, 1948); and Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (1951, reprinted 1982), put the 20th century in a longer perspective. On war and intelligence, see Michael Howard, War in European History (1976), and War and the Liberal Conscience (1978); Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (1959, reprinted 1981); and Ernest R. May (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (1984). Theoretical works on the nature of international relations include Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (1985); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (1959, reprinted 1965); and F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States (1963). Julius Stone, Visions of World Order: Between State Power and Human Justice (1984), explores the laws governing international relations in the modern world. Key terms and concepts of international politics are analyzed in David Weigall, Britain & the World, 18151986: A Dictionary of International Relations (1987); and, in a larger work, Edmund Jan Osmnczyk, The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements (1985). World War I Works on the origins of World War I include Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vol. (195257, reprinted 1980; originally published in Italian, 194243); Laurence Lafore, The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I (1965, reprinted 1981); Dwight E. Lee, The Outbreak of the First World War: Causes and Responsibilities, 4th ed. (1975); V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (1973); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (1977); and James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (1984). Diplomacy of the war years is explored in Gerd Hardach, The First World War, 19141918 (1977; originally published in German, 1973); Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C. Vedeler, The World in the Crucible, 19141919 (1984); Z.A.B. Zeman, The Gentlemen Negotiators (also published as A Diplomatic History of the First World War, 1971); and Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 19171918 (1959, reissued 1970; also published as Wilson vs. Lenin, 1959, reissued 1967). Peacemaking 1919 The history of the Paris Peace Conference is found in the reminiscences of the principal participants, which are regrettably dated and tendentious, except for Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (1933, reprinted 1984), a memoir of lasting value. N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (1968), explores Wilsonianism. The peace conference and the Russian problem are treated in Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 19181919 (1967); George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (1961); and Stephen White, The Origins of Detente: The Genoa Conference and SovietWestern Relations, 19211922 (1985). French security during and after 1919 is analyzed by Walter A. McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 19141924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (1978); and Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 19191933 (1979). Reparations at the peace conference are detailed in Marc Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 19161923 (1980). John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919, reissued 1971); and tienne Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace: or, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes (1946, reprinted 1979), are also worth consulting. The fragile 1920s Pierre Renouvin, War and Aftermath, 19141929 (1968; originally published in French, 1957); and Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 19191939 (1971), provide excellent historical summaries. Economic history is chronicled by Derek H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 19191929 (1977). A keen portrayal of the statesmen of the period is offered in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats: 19191939 (1953, reissued 1994). The settlement in East Asia and U.S.JapaneseChinese relations are outlined in Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 19211931 (1965), and Across the Pacific: An Inner History of AmericanEast Asian Relations (1967). U.S. policy in Latin America is characterized by Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations (1974). The broadest overview of European diplomacy in the 1920s, reinterpreted in light of new documentation, is Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I (1975); while Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (1976), discusses the settlements of mid-decade. The U.S.S.R. is covered exhaustively and insightfully in Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 191773, 2nd ed. (1974). The U.S.Soviet contacts of the 1920s are explored in Joan Hoff-Wilson, Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 19181933 (1974). F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 2 vol. (1952, reprinted 1986); and George Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations (1973), trace the League's formation and effect. Eastern European diplomacy is expertly covered by Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 19191925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (1962, reprinted 1974); and F. Gregory Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia (1975). Origins of World War II A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (1961, reissued with a new introduction, 1983), is still excellent on British and French policy, but idiosyncratic on Hitler. The debate over Taylor's revisionism is compiled in E.M. Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War: Historical Interpretations (1971). Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second World War, 2nd ed. (1979), offers an informative historical summary. Pierre Renouvin, World War II and Its Origins: International Relations, 19291945 (1968; originally published in French, 1958), is a standard source. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (1948, reissued 1985), is a classic memoir. Nazi diplomacy is covered in detail in Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 193336 (1970), and The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 19371939 (1980). Other good interpretations include Alan Bullock, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny, rev. ed. (1962); Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (1973; originally published in German, 1971); and Eberhard Jckel, Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power (1972, reissued as Hitler's World View, 1981; originally published in German, 1969).Specific topics are addressed in the following: on Fascist Italy, Macgregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 19391941 (1982); and Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire (1976); on France, Anthony P. Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 19361939 (1977); on British appeasement, Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (1966); A.L. Rowse, Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 19331939 (1961); and Telford Taylor, Munich: The Price of Peace (1979); and on the United States, Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 19351941 (1966); Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (1962); and Arnold A. Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 19331938 (1969, reissued 1976). The economic collapse of the 1930s is covered in Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 19291939, rev. ed. (1986); and its diplomatic effects in David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 19301939 (1980). Further topics are covered in these works: on military preparations, Donald Cameron Watt, Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second World War (1975); and Robert J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 19331940 (1978); and on the origins of the Pacific war, Arnold A. Offner, The Origins of the Second World War: American Foreign Policy and World Politics, 19171941 (1975, reprinted 1986); and Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (1987), chronicling the lead-up to Pearl Harbor. World War II and after A monumental survey of European politics during World War II is presented in Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 5 vol. (196270). Other works on diplomatic developments include Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II, 2nd ed. (1979), and Roosevelt and World War II (1969); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought, 2nd ed. (1967); Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegfhrung, 19401941, 2nd ed. (1982); William H. McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 19411946 (1953, reprinted 1970); Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 19391945 (1977); and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 19391945 (1968). Global relations after 1945 are summarized in Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945, 5th ed. (1987); Peter Lane, Europe Since 1945 (1985); Robert A. Divine, Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History, 3rd ed. (1985); Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 19451973 (1974, reprinted 1982; originally published in French, 1973); Paul Y. Hammond, Cold War and Dtente: The American Foreign Policy Process Since 1945 (1975); and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (1982). The Middle East is treated by Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 19471974 (1978, reissued 1984); Ritchie Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars (1984); and Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy (1981). European recovery after the war is the subject of Walter Laqueur, The Rebirth of Europe (1970); and Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe: From Devastation to Unity (1970). Origins of the Cold War The StalinTruman years are documented by Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vol. (195556, reprinted 198687); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (1969, reprinted 1987); George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 2 vol. (196772); and Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, 2 vol. (196365). Insightful histories include John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 19411947 (1972), and The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (1987); Paul Seabury, The Rise and Decline of the Cold War (1967); Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (1967, reprinted 1971); Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (1977); Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 194546 (1986); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (1992).The following are works of scholarship on the Cold War by authors who clearly regarded themselves as left-revisionist: William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 2nd rev. ed. (1972); Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (1969); Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power, rev. ed. (1985); and David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War, rev. ed. (1971). However, Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (1973), critiques their logic and use of evidence.The Soviet side is discussed in Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 19411945 (1979); Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (1971, reprinted 1983); David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983); and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 19451970 (1970). Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (1963, reissued 1985); and William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War (1982), are sympathetic accounts. On the wise men surrounding Truman during the late 1940s, the critique by Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 19411949 (1970), is useful; as is a later, more sympathetic work, Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy (1986). The standard earlier work on atomic policy is A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 1 by Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World, 1939/46 (1962), and vol. 2 by Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (1969). A later work by Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 19451950 (1980), makes use of declassified material. Nuclear strategy is examined in the works by Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), The Development of American Strategic Thought, 19451969, 4 vol. in 6 (198788); and by Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 19541960 (1978). The origins of the Korean War are explored in Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 19431953 (1983); while the war itself is treated in the earlier study by David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (1964). Total Cold War, 195772 The concept of total Cold War is described in Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (1985). World trends after Sputnik are also the subject of W.W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (1972). The crises of the era are brilliantly analyzed in Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (1991). Interesting memoirs are those by Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. from Russian (1970), and Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. from Russian (1974); Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (1978); and Henry Kissinger, White House Years (1979). The Kennedy administration is considered in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (1965, reprinted 1983); Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (1967); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971); Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (1981); and Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (1980). The Sino-Soviet split is explored by Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics (1976), continued in his Sino-Soviet Confrontation Since Mao Zedong: Dispute, Detente, or Conflict? (1987); Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 19561961 (1962, reissued 1969); and William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (1964). The phenomenon of Gaullism is treated in Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (1971; originally published in French, 1970); W.W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic (1966); and Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (1971). Studies of postwar German policies include William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (1978); Gerhard Wettig, Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp: The Soviet Union, East Germany, and the German Problem, 19651972 (1975; originally published in German, 3 vol. in 4, 197273); and Peter H. Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West & East: On the Threshold of a New European Era (1974). Third World countries General works on European decolonization include John D. Hargreaves, The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa: Essays in Contemporary History (1979); Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Lewis (eds.), The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 19401960 (1982); and Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 19141967 (1968). Soviet penetration of the Third World is investigated in Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (1982); Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (1976); and Robert H. Donaldson (ed.), The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures (1981). The Vietnam War is treated in William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 19541975 (1986); Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (1983); and George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 19501975, 2nd ed. (1986). Special topics are addressed in David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (1972, reprinted 1983), on U.S. involvement; on the Tet Offensive, Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 2 vol. (1977); and on American military mistakes, Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982). The global village since 1972 For the contemporary period, memoirs become increasingly important. All the principals in the Carter administration produced lengthy accounts: Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (1982); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (1983); and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 19771981 (1983). A fine summary of the administration is Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (1986). China since 1970 is the subject of Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, trans. from Russian (1986); and C.G. Jacobsen, Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao: The Chairman's Legacy (1981). Middle Eastern diplomacy is expertly analyzed in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab States (1984); and general Third World problems in Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (1985). Soviet policy is the subject of Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 19701982 (1983); Richard F. Staar, USSR Foreign Policies After Detente, rev. ed. (1987); and Roberta Goren, The Soviet Union and Terrorism (1984). A thorough account of the decline of dtente between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is given in Raymond L. Garthoff, Dtente and Confrontation: AmericanSoviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (1985). Arms race and disarmament Specific issues of armament and disarmament are discussed in National Academy of Sciences (U.S.), Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues (1985); Curt Gasteyger, Searching for World Security: Understanding Global Armament and Disarmament (1985); and William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II (1986). Divergent views on the future of nuclear weapons are found in Keith B. Payne, Strategic Defense: Star Wars in Perspective (1986); Craig Snyder (ed.), The Strategic Defense Debate: Can Star Wars Make Us Safe? (1986); James H. Wyllie, European Security in the Nuclear Age (1986); Donald M. Snow, The Necessary Peace: Nuclear Weapons and Superpower Relations (1987); Angelo Codevilla, While Others Build: A Commonsense Approach to the Strategic Defense Initiative (1988); and especially Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope (1984). Robert M. Lawrence, Strategic Defense Initiative (1987), is a bibliography. The end of the Cold War The Reagan administration's foreign policies are documented in the memoirs of Ronald Reagan, An American Life (1990); Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (1990); and Peter Schweizer, Victory (1994). David E. Kyvig (ed.), Reagan and the World (1990), contains contrasting scholarly judgments. Michael Pugh and Phil Williams (eds.), Superpower Politics: Change in the United States and the Soviet Union (1990), explores the transition in policy from Reagan to Bush. The Bush administration is analyzed in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (1993).The new thinking in the Soviet Union was treated by numerous authors in the late 1980s, but events always outran their observations. Interpretations of the period include Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura (eds.), Gorbachev's Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments (1988); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Alex Pravda (eds.), Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies (1990); Alfred J. Rieber and Alvin Z. Rubinstein (eds.), Perestroika at the Crossroads (1991); and Jiri Valenta and Frank Cibulka (eds.), Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts (1990). A thoughtful overview of these revolutionary years is William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (1990).Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (1990), is an eyewitness narrative of the liberation of eastern Europe; while Charles Gati, The Bloc that Failed: SovietEast European Relations in Transition (1990), offers a longer-range scholarly analysis. The integration movement and future of western Europe are treated in William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe (1990); Gary L. Geipel (ed.), The Future of Germany (1990); Franoise de La Serre, Jacques Leruez, and Helen Wallace (eds.), French and British Foreign Policies in Transition: The Challenge of Adjustment (1990); and Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, Democracy and its Discontents, 19631991, 2nd ed. (1993).U.S.Japanese tensions are the subject of Alan D. Romberg and Tadashi Yamamoto (eds.), Same Bed, Different Dreams: America and JapanSocieties in Transition (1990). The American role in Panama, Nicaragua, Chile, and other locations of the region is analyzed by Howard J. Wiarda, The Democratic Revolution in Latin America: History, Politics, and U.S. Policy (1990); and Dario Moreno, U.S. Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate (1990). Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (eds.), Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (1990), studies the ArabIsraeli conflict in the 1980s.Contrasting views in the debate on the decline of the American century are presented in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflicts from 1500 to 2000 (1987); Richard Cohen and Peter A. Wilson, Superpowers in Economic Decline: U.S. Strategy for the Transcentury Era (1990); Henry R. Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (1990); and Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990). Three elder statesmen discuss the prospects for a new world order: Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace (1994); Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (1994); and William E. Odom, America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War (1993). Jonathan Clarke and James Clad, After the Crusade: American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower Age (1995), is also of interest. Walter A. McDougall Dependence and disintegration in the global village, 197387 Events after the 1960s seemed to suggest that the world was entering an era both of complex interdependence among states and of disintegration of the normative values and institutions by which international behaviour had, to a reliable extent, been made predictable. Perhaps this was not an anomaly, for if modern weapons, communications satellites, and global finance and commerce really had created a global village, in which the security and well-being of all peoples were interdependent, then by the same token the opportunities had never been greater for ethnic, religious, ideological, or economic differences to spark resentment and conflict among the villagers. In a world so seemingly out of control, it was perhaps a wonder that politics were not even more violent and anarchic, for the liberal dreams of progress nurtured in the 19th century had surely proved false. The spread of modern technology and economic growth around the world had not necessarily increased the number of societies based on human rights and the rule of law, nor had multilateral institutions like the United Nations or financial and economic interdependence created a higher unity and common purpose among nations, except within the durable and democratic North Atlantic alliance. Instead, the world after the 1960s saw a proliferation of violence at every level except war among developed nations, a world financial structure under tremendous strain, the worst economic downturn since the 1930s and reduced growth rates thereafter, recurrent fears of an energy crisis, the depletion of resources and concurrent global pollution, famine and genocidal dictators in parts of Africa and Asia, the rise of an aggressive religious fundamentalism in the Muslim world, and widespread political terrorism in the Middle East and Europe. The superpowers never ceased to compete in the realms of strategic weapons and influence in the Third World and thus failed to sustain their brief experiment with dtente. As President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, concluded: The factors that make for international instability are gaining the historical upper hand over the forces that work for more organized cooperation. The unavoidable conclusion of any detached analysis of global trends is that social turmoil, political unrest, economic crisis, and international friction are likely to become more widespread during the remainder of this century. The decline of dtente General Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon were understandably optimistic in the wake of the endorsement by the 24th Party Congress of the Soviet peace program in 1971 and Nixon's landslide reelection in 1972. Both expected their new relationship to mature over the course of Nixon's second term. Dtente, however, had fragile foundations in foreign as well as domestic policy. The Soviets viewed it as a form of mere peaceful coexistence in which revolutionary forces could be expected to take advantage of the new American restraint, while the U.S. administration implicitly sold dtente as a means of restraining Communist activity around the world. American conservatives were bound to lose faith in dtente with each new incident of Soviet assertiveness, while liberals remained hostile to Nixon himself, his realpolitik, and his predilection for the use of force. Between 1973 and 1976 Soviet advances in the Third World, the destruction of Nixon's presidency in the Watergate scandal, and congressional actions to limit the foreign policy prerogatives of the White House undermined the domestic foundations of dtente. After 1977 the U.S.S.R. seemed to take advantage of the Carter administration's vacillations in Third World conflicts and in arms-control talks, until the Democrats themselves reluctantly announced the demise of dtente following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Peacemaking, 191922 The bells, flags, crowds, and tears of Armistice Day 1918 testified to the relief of exhausted Europeans that the killing had stopped and underscored their hopes that a just and lasting peace might repair the damage, right the wrongs, and revive prosperity in a broken world. Woodrow Wilson's call for a new and democratic diplomacy, backed by the suddenly commanding prestige and power of the United States, suggested that the dream of a New Jerusalem in world politics was not merely Armistice euphoria. A century before, Europe's aristocratic rulers had convened in the capital of dynasties, Vienna, to fashion a peace repudiating the nationalist and democratic principles of the French Revolution. Now, democratic statesmen would convene in the capital of liberty, Paris, to remake a Europe that had overthrown monarchical imperialism once and for all in this war to end war. In fact, the immense destruction done to the political and economic landmarks of the prewar world would have made the task of peacemaking daunting even if the victors had shared a united vision, which they did not. Central and eastern Europe were in a turmoil in the wake of the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman collapses. Revolution sputtered in Berlin and elsewhere, and civil war in Russia. Trench warfare had left large swaths of northern France, Belgium, and Poland in ruin. The war had cost millions of dead and wounded and more than $236,000,000,000 in direct costs and property losses. Ethnic hatreds and rivalries could not be expunged at a stroke, and their persistence hindered the effort to draw or redraw dozens of boundaries, including those of the successor states emerging from the Habsburg empire. In the colonial world the war among the imperial powers gave a strong impetus to nationalist movements. India alone provided 943,000 soldiers and workers to the British war effort, and the French empire provided the home country with 928,000. These men brought home a familiarity with European life and the new anti-imperialist ideas of Wilson or Lenin. The war also weakened the European powers vis--vis the United States and Japan, destroyed the prewar monetary stability, and disrupted trade and manufactures. In sum, a return to 1914 normalcy was impossible. But what could, or should, replace it? As the French foreign minister Stphen Pichon observed, the war's end meant only that the era of difficulties begins. The Paris Peace Conference ultimately produced five treaties, each named after the suburban locale in which it was signed: the Treaty of Versailles with Germany (June 28, 1919); the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria (Sept. 10, 1919); the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria (Nov. 27, 1919); the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (June 4, 1920); and the Treaty of Svres with Ottoman Turkey (Aug. 10, 1920). In addition, the Washington Conference treaties on naval armaments, China, and the Pacific (192122) established a postwar regime in those areas. Competing visions of stability The idealist vision According to the armistice agreement the peace was to be based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. But the French and British had already expressed reservations about them, and, in many cases, the vague Wilsonian principles lent themselves to varying interpretations when applied to complex realities. Nevertheless, Wilson anticipated the peace conference with high hopes that his principles would prevail, either because of their popularity with common people everywhere, or because U.S. financial leverage would oblige European statesmen to follow his lead. Tell me what is right, he instructed his delegation on the George Washington en route to Paris, and I will fight for it. Unique among the victor powers, the United States would not ask any territorial gains or reparations and would thereby be fre